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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 32 1981 NUMBER 3
SOIFER TO THE RESCUE OF HISTORY
RAOUL BERGER*
In his belated review of my Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 Professor
Aviam Soifer2 gallops furiously to the rescue of history from
Berger's perilous heresy, "There is a crescendo building up to-
ward revision or reversal of the recent interpretation of consti-
tutional alteration [judicial amendment of the Constitution]." 3
The history Berger mustered "may be extremely useful to a van-
guard of judges or Justices convinced of the need strictly to con-
strue the Civil War Amendments and civil rights statutes.' 4 Al-
ready-this I had not known-three federal judges and three
state court justices have been infected; they have cited Berger's
work."
Soifer focuses on the "original sources"; his "foremost con-
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, 1962-65; Charles Warren
Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University, 1971-76. A.B. 1932, Uni-
versity of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University;, LL.M. 1938, Harvard
University.
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JuDLxRr. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FouRTEENmT
AMENDMENT (1977).
2. Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 651 (1979).
3. Id. at 652 (emphasis added). The Court was "determined to carry through a con-
stitutional revolution ... ." Kelly, Clio and the Constitution: An Illicit Love Affair, SuP.
CT. REV. 119, 158 (1965). Professor Louis Lusky refers to "the Court's new and grander
conception of its own place in the governmental scheme," and the "assertion of power to
revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by
Article V." Lusky, Essay-Review, 6 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 408, 406 (1979) (emphasis
added).
4. Soifer, supra note 2, at 652.
5. Id. at 652 n.9. See Appendix A for an extract from the dissenting opinion of Cir-
cuit Judge Graafeiland, in which three of his Second Circuit brethren concur.
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cern is with the [historical] evidence," to which he brings a
"diachronic sense of historical development," on the basis of
which he charges me with "the worst type of law office history,"
"emphasiz[ing] how badly Berger misuses historical materials."
His fifty-five page screed represents an effort to quarrel his way
into notice by clawing up the back of one whom he describes as
"a distinguished author."'7 Strident invective fills his every
page.8 So gross and reckless are his many misrepresentations
that one might attribute them to malice but for his inability to
weigh evidence, to comprehend what he reads. For him "a veil of
rhetoric supplants proof."9 On the most charitable view, he "was
in haste to teach what he had not learned. 10
Why answer one who is so patently a novice? Because his
fellow activists take in each other's washing, quoting their bare
assertions so long as they are derogatory. How much more will
Soifer's fifty-five pages of "documentation" become activist gos-
pel.11 Then too, having nailed my thesis to the door, I am not
minded to leave it bespattered with mud.
Soifer's egregious misrepresentations can quickly be demon-
strated. (1) In my Introduction I wrote by way of "Background"
that
At the inception of their crusade the abolitionists peered up at
an almost unscalable cliff. Charles Sumner destined to become
a leading spokesman for extreme abolitionist views, wrote in
1834, upon his first sight of slaves, "My worst preconception of
their appearance and their ignorance did not fall as low- as
their actual stupidity [etc.] . . .,,2
6. Id. at 654-55.
7. Id. at 652.
8. E.g., "Berger grossly misuses Professor Horwitz," id. at 679; "very poor history,"
id. at 654; "abuses the quotations," id.; "startling penchant for selective quotation," id.
at 681; "ignores the myriad statements ... that directly contradict his single-minded
theory," id. at 657; "glaring omissions," id. at 676; etc., etc.
9. 0. HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HiSTORy 289 (1979).
10. S. JOHNSON, RASSELAS, POEMS AND SELECTED PROSE 400 (B.H. Bronson ed. 1958).
11. Already, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding
60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 219 n.55 (1980), cites Soifer to show that my book has not been "well
received," though despite Soifer's disparagement of my history Brest concedes that "the
adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it not to encompass voting
discrimination at all," id. at 234 n.115, the central proposition of my book. Earlier, Brest
agreed that "the nation was not ready to eliminate [school segregation] in the 1860's."
Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 11.
12. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 10-11 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 32
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This Soifer transforms into Berger's "attempt to show that
Sumner, though an extreme abolitionist was racist ... [;] [it]
apparently is meant to prove that the 39th Congress was deeply
racist in 1866. " 1s Patently an "extreme abolitionist" would be
antiracist, not racist, and he could understandably be appalled
by his first sight of slaves. Nor did I remotely intimate that
Sumner's reaction in 1834 constituted proof that the 39th Con-
gress "was deeply racist in 1866." Such methods I leave to
Soifer. Instead I delineated the perceptions of the 39th Congress
by what was said in its halls in 1866.
(2) In my Introduction I observed that
Time and again Republicans [in the 39th Congress] took ac-
count of race prejudice as an inescapable fact. George W. Ju-
lian of Indiana referred to the "proverbial hatred" of Negroes,
Senator Henry S. Lane of Indiana to the "almost ineradicable
prejudice," Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois to the "morbid
prejudice," Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada to the
"nearly insurmountable" prejudice, James F. Wilson of Iowa to
the "iron-cased prejudice" against blacks."
At a later point I stated that "the framers shared the prejudices
of their Northern constituency, to recall only George W. Julian's
statement in the House: 'The real trouble is we hate the ne-
gro.' "i Soifer comments, "Berger's reading of this statement in
isolation clearly indicates to him that Julian hated the Negro
.... [H]owever, the statement is clearly a lament on the diffi-
culty in overcoming race hatred, not an endorsement of it. ' ' l6
Self-evidently Julian's emphasis on "[tihe real trouble" indicates
his disapproval of pervasive prejudice. To wrest from that bare
quotation an intent to prove Julian's own racism is a blatant
perversion.
Soifer's discussion of racism further illustrates his inability
to comprehend what he reads:
Berger is correct, of course, in his assertion that many
Northerners were Negrophobic, That does not mean that they
all were, or even that a majority in most Congressional districts
13. Soifer, supra note 2, at 694-95 n.205.
14. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 13.
15. Id. at 91 (emphasis added and omitted).
16. Soifer, supra note 2, at 667 (emphasis added).
1981] 429
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were racist .. . .Nor does it prove that a majority of their
elected representatives were committed to pandering to preva-
lent racism.
17
Yet he quotes Julian: -"no fact is more notorious, and at the
same time more discreditable, than the nearly universal
prejudice of the white race in our country against the negro."'18
Senator Henry Wilson, the Massachusetts Radical, stated in the
Senate in January 1869 before the fifteenth amendment was rat-
ified, "There is not today a square mile in the United States
where the advocacy of the equal rights and privileges of those
colored men has not been in the past and is not now unpopu-
lar." 9 That the Congress "pandered" to those prejudices will
shortly appear from their exclusion of suffrage from the four-
teenth amendment. As notes William Gillette,0 whose work
bears the imprimatur of Professor David Donald,2 1 a Recon-
struction historian to whom Soifer pays tribute,22 "Most Con-
gressmen did not intend to risk drowning by swimming against
the treacherous current of racial prejudice and opposition to Ne-
gro suffrage."2 3 They read the election returns, as I shall now
show.
The exclusion of suffrage, my central thesis, never really no-
ticed by Soifer,24 may serve as the acid test of his numerous di-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 667 n.74 (emphasis added).
19. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 240. See also the remarks of Justice Davis, note 95
infra, and Professor Donald, note 187 infra. Throughout this Article I shall cite to my
book where the original source is cited in order (1) to call attention to confirmatory
materials, (2) to show that those materials were spread before Soifer, and (3) to conserve
space.
In an article published in The Nation, Thomas G. Shearman wrote: "The members
from Indiana and Southern Illinois well knew that their constituents had barely over-
come their prejudices sufficiently to tolerate even the residence of negroes among them,
and that any greater liberality would be highly repulsive to them." 3 The Nation 81, 90
(1866), quoted in C. FAIRMAN, infra note 43, at 1283 n.246. During the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment, Senator John Sherman of Ohio stated in the Senate, "We do not
like Negroes. We do not conceal our dislike." Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical
Race Policy, in NEw FRONTIER OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 128 (H. Hyman ed.
1966).
20. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1969).
21. Id. at 15.
22. See Soifer, supra note 2, at 693 n.205.
23. W. GILLETTE, supra note 20, at 25.
24. His versions of my "central" point, e.g., Soifer, supra note 2, at 660, are wildly
[Vol. 32430
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vagations, detours that serve only to sidetrack the central issue.
In my opening pages I stated,
the proof is all but incontrovertible that the framers meant to
leave control of suffrage with the States, which had always ex-
ercised such control, and to exclude federal intrusion .... If
that intention is demonstrable, the "one man, one vote" cases
represent... a 180-degree revision, taking from the States a
power that unmistakably was left to them. That poses the
stark issue whether such revisory power was conferred on the
Court.
25
To round out the picture, I examined the meaning the terms of
the fourteenth amendment had for the framers, and in course
thereof, examined the history of the antecedent Civil Rights
Act2" enacted by the same Congress at the very same session.
Soifer bogs down in details of the Civil Rights Act and ignores
the central issue: given a clearly discernible intention to bar suf-
frage, may the Court replace the framers' choices by its own?
Whatever the scope of the terms of Act or amendment, they
cannot on traditional canons comprehend the suffrage that was
unmistakably excluded.27 Because that issue is central, a few
facts are in order.
Justice Brennan observed that "17 or 19" Northern States
had rejected black suffrage between 1865 and 1868.8 Conse-
quently, Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction of both Houses, which drafted the amendment,
stated that it would be "futile to ask three-quarters of the States
to do. . . the very thing most of them have already refused to
do . . ."9 Another member of the Committee, Senator Jacob
Howard, who explained the amendment to the Senate, said that
"three-fourths of the States... could not be induced to grant
off the mark.
25. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 7-8. This is not, as Soifer indicates, a matter of
"strict construction," Soifer, supra note 2, at 653, but of flouting the unmistakable inten-
tion of the framers.
26. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 21, 14 Stat. 27.
27. "'A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, and
within its meaning, though not within its letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the
law."' Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (quoting Smythe v. Fiske, 92 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 47, 49 (1874)).
28. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 90.
29. Id. at 59.
1981] 431
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the right of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction,
to the colored race."3 0 The unanimous Report of the Joint Com-
mittee stated that it "was doubtful . . . whether the States
would consent to surrender a power [over suffrage] they had al-
ways exercised, and to" which they were attached. ' 31 Hence, it
was thought best to "leave the whole question with the people of
each State, '32 that is, to leave State control untouched. An ac-
tivist, Professor Louis Lusky, refers to "Justice Harlan's irrefu-
table and unrefuted demonstration in dissent that the Four-
teenth Amendment was not intended to protect the right to
vote, much less to guarantee the right to vote."33 Professor Ger-
30. Id. at 109-10. Another member of the Joint Committee, Senator George W. Wil-
liams of Oregon, stated,
the people of these United States are not prepared to surrender to Congress
the absolute right to determine as to the qualifications of voters in the respec-
tive States, or to adopt the proposition that all persons, without distinction of
race or color, shall enjoy political rights and privileges equal to those now pos-
sessed by the white people of the country. Sir, some of the States have lately
spoken upon that subject. Wisconsin and Connecticut, northern, loyal, and re-
publican States, have recently declared that they would not allow the negroes
within their own borders political rights; and is it probable that of the thirty-
six States more than six, at the most, would at this time adopt the constitu-
tional amendment proposed by the gentleman?
Put it before the country and commit the Union party to it, the amend-
ment will be defeated and the Union party overwhelmed in its support-and
the control of this Government would pass into the hands of men who have
more or less sympathized with the rebellion; and I say that it is of more conse-
quence, in my judgment, that the control of this Government should remain in
the hands of the men who stood up for the Union during the late war than any
constitutional amendment should be adopted by which the right of suffrage
should be extended to any person or persons not now enjoying it.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Seas., S. App. 95, 96 (1866).
31. R. BERoER, supra note 1, at 84.
32. Id. Against this background measure Soifer's "Berger also does not consider the
possibility that retrospective editorial control might have altered the transcript, as it
frequently does the Congressional Record today," Soifer, supra note 2, at 656 n.28 (em-
phasis added). Bearing in mind that the leaders and the Committee Report are echoed
by numerous statements by other Republicans, it would have required a gigantic conspir-
acy to alter the statements of all concerned. The defeat of suffrage proposals by votes of
125 to 12 and 34 to 4 alone show such speculation to be chimerical. See text accompany-
ing notes 42 & 43 infra. Although Soifer deplores my "faith in the validity of legislative
debates," Soifer, supra note 2, at 655 n.18, the Supreme Court attaches great weight to
"explicit statements of the meaning of the statutory language made by Committee re-
ports and members of the Committees on the floor." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy
Co., 315 U.S. 110, 225 (1942).
33. Lusky, supra note 3, at 406. Suffrage was the crucial, basic right: "Freedom for
the freedman, moreover, was meaningless unless he had the ballot to protect himself."
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aid Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers agree" that
the "one person-one vote" lacks all historical justification."' In a
solitary remark Soifer grudgingly allows that
Berger is probably correct in arguing that suffrage was not
deemed a civil right in 1866 ... [and] a majority of the 39th
Congress, if they gave any thought to it at all might not then
have included a right to integrated schooling in their definition
of civil rights. But the members of the 39th Congress did not
carefully limit and specify the civil rights with which they
were concerned.35
This is belied by the facts, as will more particularly appear
in the subsequent discussion of the Civil Rights Act. That the
framers "gave thought" to "integrated schooling" is demon-
strated by James Wilson's-chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee-assurance that the words "civil rights" do not
W. GmLE=TT, supra note 20, at 22; see note 173 infra. Contrast Soifer's addiction to
glittering generalities: "[Ildealistic concern for the negro was not an insignificant impulse
shared by only a few men of noble intellect; rather it was a compulsive and complex
force that powerfully shaped the minds and actions of ... the great body of Republi-
cans," with their treatment of Negro suffrage. "[W]hite Americans resented or resisted
it," W. GmL=rr, supra note 20, at 27. Even in 1868 the Republican suffrage plank
handed "Negro suffrage in the North over to the northern states." Id. at 37. Soifer al-
ways prefers resounding rhetoric to brute fact.
Morton Keller stated, "The off-year elections of 1867," during which ratification of
the fourteenth amendment was being debated, "made clear the popular hostility to black
suffrage in the North." R. BERaGER, supra note 1, at 56. And he noted that "most congres-
sional Republicans were aware of (and shared) their constituents' hostility to black suf-
frage." Id. at 105. Soifer shrugs this off because Berger "fails to notice Keller's central
point" that after the Civil War "a broader view of civil equality left its mark everywhere
in Congress" and Soifer concludes that "[t]he possibility of oscillation is foreign to Ber-
ger's world of static text and static history," ever preferring vague generalities to un-
pleasant particulars: the 39th Congress rejected suffrage by votes of 125 to 12 and 34 to
4. The pendulum stopped "oscillating" here.
34. Gunther, Too Much a Battle With Strawmen, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1977, at 4,
col. 4. Gunther also wrote, "The ultimate justification for the Reynolds ruling is hard, if
not impossible, to set forth in constitutionally legitimate terms. It rests, rather, on the
view that courts are authorized to step in when injustices exist and other institutions fail
to act. That is a dangerous-and I think illegitimate-prescription for judicial action."
Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817, 825. In the debates on the fifteenth amendment there are fre-
quent references to the need for the amendment because the fourteenth had failed to
confer suffrage. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 313, 321-23 (1979). Soifer erroneously states that Berger "purports to do a
history of the legal thought of the period," Soifer, supra note 2, at 688, when I focused
almost exclusively on the framing of the fourteenth amendment.
35. Soifer, supra note 2, at 705 (emphasis added).
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"mean that all citizens shall sit on juries, or that their children
shall attend the same schools."3 6 An activist, Professor Henry J.
Abraham, concludes that "any genuinely objective... examina-
tion of the debates. . demonstrates that the authors and sup-
porters [of the fourteenth amendment] specifically rejected its
application to segregated schools and the franchise . . . [and
meant] 'to leave suffrage and segregation beyond federal control,
to leave it with the States .... "- Honest debate must proceed
from the undeniable facts and deal with the questions they
pose:3s whence did the Court derive power to reverse the fram-
ers' decisions, to revise the amendment?
If Soifer ever faced up to that issue, it is lost in the welter of
irrelevant discussion-the impact of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, of natural law, of abolitionist theology-that burdens his
pages. Instead Soifer dwells on Berger's omission to "consider
changes in the thought or voting patterns of the North during
the 1850's," even "the most obviously relevant events just be-
yond the halls of Congress . . .in the winter of 1865-1866. Yet
these events are crucial to an understanding of congressional in-
tent."39 Be the "complexity and mutability of popular thought
on such matters as race and federalism immediately following
the Civil War"' 0 what they may, "popular and political thought"
undeniably rejected suffrage and desegregation when it came to
drafting the Act and amendment in 1866. What boots the "im-
pact" of abolitionist theology when John Bingham, "a leading
36. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 27 (emphasis added). For confirmatory evidence see
id. at 117-33.
37. Abraham, Essay-Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467-68 (1979)(quoting R. BER-
GER, supra note 1, at 245). Professor Nathaniel Nathanson wrote about my view that the
framers contemplated that the fourteenth amendment would not require desegregation
or Negro suffrage:
These are not surprising historical conclusions. The first was quite conclusively
demonstrated by Alexander Bickel.... [T]he second was also convincingly
demonstrated by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan.... Mr. Berger's
independent research and analysis confirms and adds weight to those
conclusions.
Nathanson, Constitutional Interpretation and the Democratic Process, 56 Tax. L. Rv.
579, 581 (1978).
38. For an activist's honest evaluation of these questions, see Perry, Essay-Review,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978).
39. Soifer, supra note 2, at 668 n.79, 690.
40. Id. at 688.
[Vol. 32
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congressional antislavery constitutional theorist,"' 1 led the fight
during ratification of the amendment for the admission of Ten-
nessee despite the absence of a black suffrage provision in its
constitution, and was upheld by a vote of 125 to 12.42 Charles
Sumner's parallel effort to bar Tennessee-he was the unremit-
ting advocate of abolitionist ideals-was voted down by the Sen-
ate 34 to 4.43 These facts are immediately relevant to the scope
of the amendment (for a state suffrage provision was unneces-
sary if already provided for by the amendment), and they testify
to Abolitionist impotence when the chips were down. Soifer's
canting insistence on "context, nuance," on ideals outside the
halls of Congress-"[t]he political context does much to explain
the language and votes of the 39th Congress""-cannot explain
away such decisive votes, votes that swamp his whole argument.
Whatever the influence of the Declaration of Independence, of
Abolitionist theology, of natural law, they did not suffice to pre-
vent the exclusion of suffrage and segregation. Soifer has yet to
learn from the Lord High Executioner that "[t]he flowers that
bloom in the spring, Trala, [h]ave nothing to do with the
case ,45
I. THE CWL RIGHTS ACT, NATURAL LAW, AND ABSOLUTE
RIGHTS
Soifer misleadingly attributes to me three premises of the
Civil Rights Act: judicial enforcement of fugitive slave laws, dis-
like of abolitionists by a Negrophobic North, and concepts of
state sovereignty. "From these assertions Berger derives the cen-
tral point in his argument that natural law had little impact in
1866, and that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was strictly limited
to narrowly defined rights.' 46 Natural law emphatically was not
"[t]he central point" in my demonstration of the 1866 legislative
intention. For that I relied on the text of the Act and its expla-
nations by the framers; and they relied for their enumeration of
41. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 207 n.49. See note 187 infra.
42. Id. at 79, 95.
43. Id. at 59-60. Sumner's proposal "that all persons were 'equal before the law,
whether in the courtroom or at the ballot-box' received 8 yeas to 39 nays." 6 C. FAIRMAN,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrD STATES 1264 (1971).
44. Soifer, supra note 2, at 654, 696.
45. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, THE MmAno, Act II (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1917).
46. Soifer, supra note 2, at 559-60.
1981] 435
9
Berger: Soifer to the Rescue of History
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH .CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"absolute" "fundamental" rights on Blackstone and Kent rather
than natural law. It is important to examine the Act closely, be-
cause the framers meant by the amendment merely to constitu-
tionalize the Act, i.e., to dispel constitutional doubts and to put
it beyond the possibility of repeal.47 And it furnishes the back-
ground against which to evaluate Soifer's drumfire of
misrepresentation.
Section 1 of the Bill provided in pertinent part:
[t]hat there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immu-
nities ... on account of race ... but the inhabitants of every
race ... shall have the same right to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase... hold and convey real and personal property, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, and shall be subject to like
punishment... and no other.
48
Soifer seizes on my "glaring omission" of the opening sentence
which made blacks citizens,4" an omission cured a few pages
later by my quotation of that sentence, "all persons born in the
United States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States," and are "to be free from discrimination." 50 The
significance of my "glaring omission" is that now "[a]ll citizens
were to have the same rights-and the complete and equal bene-
fit of all laws and proceedings for security of person and prop-
47. The general agreement on this fact is set forth in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 23,
43. In addition, Henry Raymond of New York adverted to the Civil Rights Bill "by
which Congress proposed to exercise precisely the powers which that [Bingham] amend-
ment was intended to confer." Cong. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866). In 1870,
Justice Bradley declared, "the civil rights bill was enacted at the same session, and but
shortly before the presentation of the fourteenth amendment ... was in pari materia,
and was probably intended to reach the same object ... the first section of the bill
covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment...." Live Stock Dealers & Butch-
ers Ass'n v. Crescent City Live Stock Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No.
8,408).
48. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasis added).
49. Soifer, supra note 2, at 676.
50. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 40. In one of the decisions that Soifer taxes me with
ignoring (Soifer, supra note 2, at 697), United States v. Rhodes, Justice Swayne held,
"The fact that one is a subject or citizen determines nothing as to his rights as such.
They vary in different localities. Citizenship has no necessary connection with the
franchise of voting ' . . or indeed any other rights, civil or political." 27 Fed. Cas. 785,
790 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
[Vol. 32
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erty-as enjoyed by paradigmatic white citizens."'5 ' Never does
Soifer inquire what was embraced by "security of person and
property," the key words.
Instead he rings the changes on the framers' intention to
protect "fundamental rights," pivoting on Senator Trumbull's
assurance that the Act would protect "such fundamental rights
as belong to every free person." 52 He charges me with omitting
"Trumbull's next words, which were that these fundamental
rights were 'such as the rights enumerated in this bill,' "53 una-
ware that my constant identification of "fundamental rights"
with those "enumerated" absolved me of needless repetition.
Soifer's word-play, "such as" does not mean "limited to,"54 over-
looks that "such as" must at least go no further than rights of
the same nature, so that the right to contract does not compre-
hend suffrage. Finally Soifer asks, "But what were such funda-
mental rights as belong to every free person?" 55 Let the framers
answer.
.II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Martin R. Thayer of Pennsylvania stated that "to avoid any
misapprehension" as to what the "fundamental rights of citizen-
ship" are, "they are stated in the bill. The same section goes on
to define with great particularity the civil rights and immunities
which are to be protected by the bill." And he added, "when
those civil rights which are first referred to in general terms
[that is, "civil rights and immunities"] are subsequently enumer-
ated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that the gen-
eral words which have been used can be extended beyond the
particulars which have been enumerated," that the Bill was for
"the protection of the fundamental rights of citizenship and
nothing else."56 Answering his question, what are "the rights of
51. Soifer, supra note 2, at 676 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 671.
53. Id. (emphasis added). See note 166 infra.
54. Soifer, supra note 2, at 670.
55. Id. at 672.
56. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis added). Senator John Sherman had
stressed at the outset the need of "naming them, defining precisely what they should
be." Id. at 24. Later he said that the bill "defines what are the incidents of freedom and
says that these men must be protected in certain rights, and so careful is its language
that it goes on and defines those rights, the right to sue and be sued ... to acquire and
1981]
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citizens," Trumbull said, they are "[t]he great fundamental
rights set forth in this bill: the right to acquire property, the
right to come and go at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in
the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose of
property. '57 It was these rights that Trumbull subsumed in stat-
ing that the free man "must be fully protected in all his rights of
person and property." Without these rights he could not ex-
ist;5e he was to be protected against lynchings and barn
burnings.
Soifer heaps scorn on my head for citing Blackstone and
Kent to "squeeze" fundamental rights into my "Procrustean
bed," because Blackstone's "star had fallen" by 1866.60 The
news had not reached the 39th Congress. Chairman Wilson ex-
plained that Blackstone had classified the "great fundamental
rights" dealt with by the Bill "under three articles": "1. The
right of personal security [for life and limb] ... [;] 2. The right
of personal liberty [freedom of locomotion without imprison-
ment] . . . [;] 3. The right of personal property." From Kent he
quoted, "The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into
the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and
the right to acquire and enjoy property." These, Wilson ex-
hold property .... ." Id. at 30.
57. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (emphasis added).
58. Soifer, supra note 2, at 672 n.107 (emphasis added). Bickel summarized: "Radi-
cals and Moderates alike-who spoke in favor of the bill were content to rest on the
point Trumbull had made. The rights to be secured by the bill were those specifically
enumerated in section 1." R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 29 n.31.
Among the "crucial" "events just beyond the halls of Congress," that I am charged
with "ignoring," is "the irreparable split between the Executive and the leaders of Con-
gress," Soifer, supra note 2, at 690-91, a "political context that does much to explain the
language and the votes of the 39th Congress." Id. at 696 (emphasis added). Soifer spends
six portentous pages on this "split." Unquestionably it led to the override of Johnson's
veto of the Civil Rights Act, id. at 695, but it did not change the "language" by one iota.
In seeking the override, Trumbull repeated that the "rights of a citizen" are "those in-
herent, fundamental rights ... such as the rights enumerated in this bill," also quoting
Kent's "the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to
acquire and enjoy property." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
Consider against this background Soifer's comment that Berger "does not accept
Harold Hyman's point that, after the Civil War, 'all certitude vanished with respect to
workaday civil rights.'" Soifer, supra note 2, at 673. The framers, however, left no doubt
about what they conceived "civil rights" to be.
59. See statements by Windom, text accompanying note 96 infra, Senator Howe,
note 83 infra and William Lawrence, text accompanying note 67 infra.
60. Soifer, supra note 2, at 677-78.
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plained, were the rights comprehended by "civil rights." 1 In re-
jecting my reference to Blackstone and Kent to show that "fun-
damental," "natural" rights "had become words of received
meaning,"62 Soifer "ignores" the fact that this was expressed in
one of the activists' sacred texts, that of Alfred Kelly:
Ultimately Revolutionary natural-rights theorists insisted lib-
erty was derived from a state of nature, but it had long before
been given a very positive and specific content. It was to be
found... above all in the common law as expounded by Coke
and Blackstone .... The notion of pulling new natural rights
from the air to allow for an indefinite expansion can hardly be
considered to be within the original spirit of the amendment.63
When, therefore, Soifer insists upon "the unbounded nature of
absolute rights,"" he substitutes wishful thinking for hard his-
torical fact.
It needs to be noted that "life, liberty, and property" were
equated by the framers with the "fundamental rights" of "per-
son and property." Thus Wilson emphasized that the rights enu-
merated were no "greater than the rights which are included in
the general term 'life, liberty, and property.' ,6 5 Senator James
Patterson of New Hampshire was opposed to "any law discrimi-
nating against [blacks] in the security of life, liberty, person,
property and the proceeds of their labor."6 William Lawrence
said that the enumerated rights were the "necessary incidents of
those absolute rights," that is, of "life, liberty and property,"
without which these "fundamental rights" could not be en-
61. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (emphasis added).
62. Soifer, supra note 2, at 677.
63. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 35 n.55. James Otis, Samuel Adams, Thomas Cush-
ing, and Thomas Gray, in a letter to Dennys de Berdt dated December 20, 1765, stated,
"the primary, absolute, natural Rights of Englishmen ... are Personal Security, Per-
sonal Liberty and Private Property." 1 S. ADAmS, WRINGS 65 (1904).
Soifer states that the abolitionists "wanted natural rights for the colored man."
Soifer, supra note 2, at 665 n.68. Ten Broek, one of his authorities, wrote that the "prin-
cipal spokesmen and theorists of the abolitionist movement, Lysander Spooner and Joel
Tiffany," regarded "privileges and immunities" (which presumably caught up natural
rights) as a right to "full and ample protection in the enjoyment of his personal security,
personal liberty and property; ... protection against oppression [and]... against law-
less violence." R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 22.
64. Soifer, supra note 2, at 677.
65. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 29.
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joyed.67 An "obvious illustration of [Berger's] startling penchant
for selective quotation," says Soifer, "is to be found in Repre-
sentative Lawrence's statement in the very speech Berger de-
scribes as 'patently' revealing the 'limited objectives of the Civil
Rights Act.' "68 What was my omission? Lawrence described the
Act as "the Magna Charta."69 But said he, "[iut does not affect
any political right, as that of suffrage, the right to sit on juries
.... This it leaves to the States .... But it does provide that
as to certain enumerated civil rights"-enumerating making
contracts, owning property, bringing law suits-there shall be no
discrimination.7 0 Such are the facts that "obviously" betray my
"startling penchant for selective quotation."
The framers underscored their narrow aims by deleting the
introductory sentence of section one of the bill: "That there
shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities . . on
account of race ... ." Notwithstanding the explanations of
Thayer and others that this general language was limited by the
enumerated rights, John Bingham, who is thought to have been
the abolitionist torchbearer, protested that the "civil rights"
phrase was "oppressive," that it would 'embrace every right
that pertains to a citizen as such" and strike down "every state
constitution which makes a discrimination on account of race or
color in any of the constitutional rights of the citizens. 7 1 At his
insistence the "no discrimination in civil rights" was deleted. 2
Soifer notes that this deletion dismayed "Alfred Kelly and other
historians assisting Thurgood Marshall and his legal team in
Brown v. Board of Education," and considers that Alexander
Bickel too became "entangled by the mysteries of silent legisla-
tive activity" in concluding that the view that "the bill dealt
only with a distinct and limited set of rights was conclusively
validated" by the deletion.73 Only Soifer has not lost his head:
"Bingham's motion was resoundingly defeated, one hundred and
thirteen to thirty-seven," indicating to Soifer that there was no
support "for any states' rights manifesto Bingham intended to
67. Id. at 25.
68. Soifer, supra note 2, at 681 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866).
71. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 119-20 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 119.
73. Soifer, supra note 2, at 685 n.169; see also R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 121.
440 [Vol. 32
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issue.''74 This was on March 9, and the measure was recommit-
ted. On March 13, Wilson returned with the Judiciary Commit-
tee's deletion amendment, explaining,
Some members of the House thought, in the general words of
the first section in relation to civil rights, it might be held by
the courts that the right of suffrage was included in those
rights. To obviate that difficulty and the difficulty growing out
of any other construction beyond the specific rights named in
the section, our amendment strikes out all of those general
terms and leaves the bill with the rights specified in the
section .75
And he stated the deletion was made because "some gentlemen
were apprehensive that the words we proposed to strike out
might give warrant for a latitudinarian construction not in-
tended." e With this explanation before them, the deletion was
approved. 7 Soifer comments that "to attribute a great deal to
the deletion after Bingham's motion was overwhelmingly de-
feated .. . is to guess about silent legislative intent, and not
simply to read the legislative transcript, as Berger purports to
do." 78 Thereby he exhibits his own neglect to read beyond the
first vote to the subsequent definitive deletion.
Soifer also relies on Lawrence's statement that there are
"anterior to and independent of all laws and constitutions...
certain absolute rights. . of which a state cannot constitution-
ally deprive" a person. Hence, Soifer asserts, "[i]t is simply im-
possible to reconcile an intention to guarantee blacks fixed and
74. Soifer, supra note 2, at 686.
75. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., let Sess. 1366-67 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 1366.
77. Id. at 1296. Lawrence commented, "for the purpose of obviating [Bingham's]
objection this clause was stricken out and forms no part of the bill as it finally passed."
Id. at 1837.
78. Soifer, supra note 2, at 685 n.109. In Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), the
Court, per Justice Stewart, said of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended
to protect a limited category of rights .... [T]he Senate bill did contain a
general provision forbidding discrimination in civil rights or immunities pre-
ceding the specific enumeration of rights .... Objections were raised in the
legislative debates to the breadth of the rights of racial equality that might be
encompassed by a prohibition so general .... [A]n amendment was accepted
striking the phrase from the bill.
Id. at 788.
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absolute civil rights with an intention to defer to the states in
the determination of what civil rights are to be protected." To
tie these "absolute natural rights" to "variable state law abso-
lutely destroys Berger's arguments.17  Lawrence followed Chan-
cellor Kent's definition of "absolute rights": "The right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and
enjoy property."80 The rights enumerated in the Civil Rights
Bill, he said, were the "necessary incidents of these absolute
rights,"81 and privileges and immunities were "confined to those
[privileges and immunities] which [are] in their nature funda-
mental [:]... the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to
acquire and enjoy property. '8 2 He emphasized that the Civil
Rights Bill "does not confer any civil right[;] . . . all these are
left to the States. But it does provide thatas to certain enumer-
ated civil rights," what "may be enjoyed by any shall be shared
by all citizens in each State .... 8s In short, Lawrence, in con-
79. Soifer, supra note 2, at 681 n.151, 682-83. The Supreme Court declared in 1873
that "the most liberal advocate of the rights conferred by [the fourteenth] amendment
have contended for nothing more than that the rights of the citizen previously existing,
and dependent wholly on State laws for their recognition, are now placed under the
protection of the Federal government.. . ." Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129,
133 (1873) (emphasis added). Senator William M. Stewart stated in the 39th Congress,
"This section [§ 1] is simply to remove the disabilities existing by laws tending to reduce
the negro to a system of peonage. It strikes at that; nothing else.... That is the whole
scope of the law." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Seas. 1785 (1866). His explanation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was embodied in the fourteenth amendment, was in-
tended to reassure the framers.
80. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832, 1833 (1866).
81. Id. at 1833.
82. Id. at 1835-36.
83. Id. at 1832. Soifer obliterates Lawrence's distinction between "absolute" and
"civil" rights, his affirmation that the "absolute" rights were protected by the Bill's enu-
merated "incidents of those absolute rights." In our own time, the Supreme Court stated
with respect to the privileges and immunities of article IV,
At one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights which
. . . were classed as "natural rights"; and that the purpose of the section was
to create right of citizens of the United States by guaranteeing the citizens of
every State the recognition of this group of rights by every other State.
But
It has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does not import that a
citizen of one State carries with him into another State fundamental privileges
and immunities which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his citizen-
ship in the State first mentioned, but on the contrary, that in every State every
citizen of every other State is to have the same privileges and immunities
which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, prevents a State
from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own.
442 [Vol. 32
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tradiction to Soifer, left it to each State to determine which of
the enumerated rights should "be enjoyed by any" and therefore
without discrimination "shall be shared by all."
It cannot be unduly emphasized that the framers sought
solely to prevent discrimination with respect to enumerated
rights which the states saw fit to grant. This plainly appears
from the face of section one of the Civil Right Bill, which for-
bade "discrimination in civil rights" and provided that blacks
should have "the same" enumerated rights as whites.8 4 That was
made clear beyond peradventure by a number of framers.
Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio stated that the Civil Rights Bill
secures "equality of protection in these enumerated rights which
the States may deem proper to confer upon any race."8' 5 Thad-
deus Stevens explained that the amendment "allows Congress to
correct unjust legislation of the States so far that the law which
operates upon one shall operate equally upon all," e.g.,
"[w]hatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish
the black man precisely in the same way.... Whatever means of
redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all.... Your civil
rights bill secures the same thing."8 " The point was nailed down
by Trumbull's assurance to the Senate: "If the State of Ken-
tucky makes no discrimination in civil rights between its citi-
zens, this bill has no operation whatever in the State of Ken-
tucky. '87 After the Johnson veto of the Bill, Trumbull reiterated
that it "in no manner interferes with the municipal regulations
of any State which protects all alike in their rights of person or
property."88 What Soifer totally misses was perfectly understood
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939). It is to be borne in mind that such discrimina-
tion is inhibited only with respect to a narrow enclave of privileges.
84. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill is set out in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
474 (1866).
85. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 176-77 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 178. In the House, Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio said of the Civil Rights
Bill "Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of
these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon
all citizens alike without distinctions based on race ... ." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1293 (1866). Similarly, William Lawrence, after stating that the Bill "leaves [politi-
cal rights] to the States, to be determined by each for itself," said, the bill "does not
confer any civil right .... But it does provide that as to certain enumerated civil rights"
what "may be enjoyed by any shall be shared by all citizens in each State." Id. at 1832.
88. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 178 n.49 (emphasis added). Against these Trumbull
explanations, Soifer argues, "Trumbull may have been mistaken in his factual assump-
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by Horatio Burchard of Illinois in the 1871 debates: the equal
protection clause "does not enjoin upon the State that it shall
provide protection by its laws, but that it shall not discriminate
in that protection."8' 9 Soifer cannot bring himself to believe that
"[tihere was no national standard of civil rights,"90 but a more
prestigious scholar, Dean Phil Neal, concluded that "the equal-
ity ordained" is "a Statewide equality, encompassing the persons
'within its jurisdiction' and not a nationwide or external equal-
ity."9 1 For it is the laws of each individual State, not of the na-
tion, that are required to afford "equal protection."
Similar inability to grasp the facts is exhibited by his rejec-
tions about the amount of protection afforded blacks in the North ... but that does not
contradict Trumbull's legal theory-that government had a duty to protect legal rights."
Soifer, supra note 2, at 673 n.111. A "mistaken" assumption does not vitiate Trumbull's
assurances-echoed by Shellabarger, see text accompanying note 85 supra, and by Law-
rence, see text accompanying note 83 supra-on which the framers acted; nor do general
statements about "fundamental rights" override specific assurances that the bill had no
operation where there was no discrimination. There could be no "mistake" as to North-
ern resistance to the central right of suffrage: "Negro voting in the North was out of the
question." W. GILLEMrE, supra note 20, at 32.
Two of the early cases which I am taxed with failing to mention, Soifer, supra note
2, at 697, make plain that the Act struck at certain discriminations. Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871), held that the Civil Rights Act gives civil actions
"whenever in the State courts any right enjoyed by white citizens is denied to them." Id.
at 592. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151), held that
whether white citizens enjoyed the right "is vital to the case. Without it our jurisdiction
cannot be maintained." Id. at 786.
89. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. H. App. 315 (1871). In the 1871 debate, James
Garfield, a participant in the 39th Congress, "reviewed fully the legislative history" of
the fourteenth amendment and stated: "It is not required that the laws shall be perfect.
They may be unwise, injudicious, even unjust, but they must be equal in their provisions
... resting upon all with equal weight." R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 181 n.57. Harold
Hyman, an authority extolled by Soifer, Soifer, supra note 2, at 688, wrote, "Instead of
formulating positively national civil rights minima, as some Republicans preferred to do,
the Amendment forbade unequal deprivation of the broad, uncodified mass of civil rights
protection which a state professed to afford . . . ." R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 181
(emphasis added). Justice Field stated that the fourteenth amendment "only inhibits
discrimination and partial enactments, favoring some to the impairment of the rights of
others," and does not transfer "to the federal government the protection of all private
rights .... ." Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (concur-
ring opinion).
90. Soifer, supra note 2, at 682. Citing Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129
(1873), Justice Stone stated that the fourteenth amendment "created no new privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship... ." Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443
(1935) (dissenting opinion, joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ.). Colgate was overruled
by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940).
91. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 184.
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tion of "the crucial distinction between full and equal protec-
tion," invoking the Civil Rights provision for "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property.'92 "Full benefit" went no further than the itali-
cized rights. Reasoning, however, that now government had a
"duty at least to secure protection of person and property as
enumerated in section 1," Soifer nimbly leaps to the conclusion
that "[i]f a state created a legal right to an education, it could
not restrict that right to whites." '
Nowhere does Soifer explain how he derives from a grant of
A and B (that is, "security of persons and property") a grant of
C-"education." Assume such a derivation, and it yet does not
comprehend desegregation, for Chairman Wilson assured the
framers that desegregated schools were not among the "civil
rights" of the Act. Wilson is confirmed by other observations.
In a discussion of the fourteenth amendment, for which he
voted, Senator Patterson said he was opposed "to any law dis-
criminating against [blacks] in the security of life, liberty, per-
son, property .... These civil rights all should enjoy. Beyond
this I am not prepared to go... ." ,,5 William Windom of Minne-
sota said that the Civil Rights Bill affords to the Negro "an
equal right, nothing more. . . to make and enforce contracts[;]
[i]t does not. . . confer the privilege of voting," nor "social
privileges. It merely provides safeguards to shield them from
wrong and outrage and to protect them in the enjoyment of...
the right to exist."96
92. Soifer, supra note 2, at 684 (emphasis added). This was how the leading aboli-
tionist theorists, Spooner and Tiffany, associated "full protection." See note 63 supra.
93. Soifer, supra note 2, at 705. But compare note 187 infra and text accompanying
notes 198 & 199 infra.
94. See text accompanying note 36 supra. Resistance to desegregated schools per-
sisted in the 1870s, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was shorn of a provision for desegre-
gated schools. Berger, supra note 34, at 329-31.
95. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 29. During a visit in April 1868 to South Carolina,
Justice David Davis, an Illinoisan, wrote, "There is more repugnance to negroes at the
West than here-repugnance I mean to any and every idea of equality." C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 43, at 482.
96. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 29 n.30. As Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin
emphasized, the South would deny Negroes
the plainest and most necessary rights of citizenship. The right to hold land[,]
... the right to collect their wages by the processes of the law when they had
earned their wages [this sheds light on what the framers had in mind by "due
process"][,] the right to appear in the courts as suitors for any wrong done
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At the outset, Stevens, whom Soifer describes as "the un-
questioned leader of the House,"' 7 had submitted to the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction a proposal that "[ajlt laws, state
or federal, shall operate impartially and equally on all persons
... ." But in summing up in favor of the fourteenth amend-
ment, he said that while he had hoped to remodel "all our insti-
tutions as to have freed them from every vestige of ... inequal-
ity of rights. . . [and so] that no distinction would be tolerated
.... This bright dream has vanished. ' 98 In fact, sweeping pro-
posals to abolish all discriminations repeatedly fell by the way-
side,9 9 so that Senator William Fessenden, chairman of the Joint
Committee acknowledged that "[w]e cannot put into the Consti-
tution, owing to existing prejudices and existing institutions, an
entire exclusion of all class distinctions."100 Soifer simply cannot
look such facts in the face but prefers to gaze into the word
"full" as if it were a crystal ball that reveals ultimate truth.
Similar crystal-gazing is disclosed by Soifer's attempt to
root an expansive reading in the provisions for enforcement:
"Sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that Berger altogether
ignores created both federal penalties and removal to the federal
courts for the right specified in section 1 .... The very exis-
tence of ongoing and open-ended enforcement power threatens
Berger's strict construction of constitutional limits."10 1 "Re-
moval to federal courts" and federal enforcement sprang from
the framers belief that blacks could not secure protection in
southern courts.102 Consequently there was no alternative to del-
egation of enforcement to the federal courts, because Congress is
them ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lot Sess., S. App. 219 (1866). See also remarks of Senator
Stewart, note 79 supra.
97, Soifer, supra note 2, at 693.
98. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 163, 173 (emphasis added). Stevens explained that
the proposed fourteenth amendment "is all that can be obtained in the present state of
public opinion .... Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that
nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent
than this." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866); see Sumner's proposal, supra
note 40.
99. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 163-64.
100. Id. at 99.
101. Soifer, supra note 2, at 689 (emphasis added).
102. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 201. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Seas. 744
(1866) (remarks of Senator John Sherman).
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not empowered to adjudicate violation of its laws.10 3 To refer to
"open-ended enforcement power" begs the question; federal en-
forcement was designed to insure that "specified" rights would
be protected, not to add to them.10 3"1 So too, in one of his many
bursts of empty rhetoric, Softer has it that "the enforcement
clauses of the Civil War Amendments indicate a new genre of
constitutional provisions, explicitly doing something quite differ-
ent from limiting governmental power. Yet Berger gives section
5 of the fourteenth amendment short shrift. ' 10 4 In Blyew v.
United States,10 5 an adverse judgment on a charge that whites
murdered blacks was appealed on the ground two black wit-
nesses were not permitted to testify. The Court observed that
section three of the Civil Rights Act confers jurisdiction of
causes "affecting persons who are denied" rights under section
one; and it held that witnesses "are no more affected. . . than is
any other person." 0 6 Although a party has the right to testify, a
witness, it held, has not. And the Court held, "It will not be
thought that Congress intended to give the District Courts juris-
diction over all causes .... They have expressly confined it to
causes affecting certain purposes. '107 Let Soifer explain how this
differs "from limiting governmental power."
Soifer's "Berger gives section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment short shrift" exposes his ignorance of the field. My chapter
103. Soifer also alludes to the expansion of "the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts ... across various areas of litigation ... ." Soifer, supra note 2, at 680 n.148.
Jurisdiction in bankruptcy and admiralty was expanded because Congress could hardly
take over needed judicial functions in traditional litigation.
103.1. Alexander Bickle considered that "there isn't any constitutional power
granted by the fifth section of Article 14 to enlarge the meaning of the due process, equal
protection or privileges and immunites clauses." He based his conclusion on the history
of the provision and "on principle." Hearings on the Supreme Court before the Senate
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1968). Professor Gerald
Gunther agreed, id.; see also text accompanying note 199 infra.
104. Id. at 689.
105. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871).
106. Id. at 591.
107. Id. at 592 (emphasis added). Soifer comments that the Court "both anticipated
and helped to lead the national retrenchment from civil rights." Soifer, supra note 2, at
698. Nevertheless, he urges, "even the Court's early narrow construction in Blyew recog-
nized broad congressional intent;" the Act "was intended to remedy such evils as
prejudices ... which naturally affect the administration of justice in the State courts,"
and that the Act was meant to reach laws which inflicted 'different..'. and often sev-
erer' punishments upon blacks." Id. And this narrow aim to bar discriminatory punish-
ments is deemed to reveal a "broad congressional intent." Pitiful reasoning.
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on section five attempted to inquire into the sources and mean-
ing of section five: "Congress shall have power to enforce ...
the provisions of this article." The source was acute distrust of
the courts engendered by pro-slavery decisions in the years pre-
ceding the Civil War. The Court itself held in 1879 that section
five conferred power of enforcement on Congress, not the
courts.10 Study of the parallel section two of the fifteenth
amendment shows that the framers considered, in the words of
Senator Oliver Morton, that by both section five and section two
108. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 221-29. To quote Senator Howard, § 5 constitutes
a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the princi-
ples of all these guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution.... It casts
upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the
sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith .... It thus imposes
upon Congress this power and this duty.
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766, 2768 (1866).
Charles Fairman comments on Thaddeus Stevens' proposal that " 'all laws... shall
operate impartially and equally"' that it "would work by its own force; courts would be
bound to disregard invidious laws." Not so Bingham's [proposal: "The Congress shall
have power to make all laws necessary. . . "] Congress would be empowered-yet noth-
ing would result save as it legislated, and anything that was enacted could be repealed."
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 1271. Senator Luke Poland, former Chief Justice of Ver-
mont, "like the rest, contemplated action by Congress and ignored direct enforcement by
the courts." Id. at 1296. Senator Howard explained that § 5 constitutes
a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the princi-
ples of these guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution .... It casts
upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it ... that no State infringes the
rights of person and property .... It enables Congress, in case the States shall
enact laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that
legislation by a formal congressional amendment.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766, 2768 (1866). While the fourteenth amendment
was in course of ratification, in January 1868, it was for Bingham "the Congress, rather
than the Court, that was to be Valiant-for-Truth; through legislative power to enforce
the amendment would the rights of citizenship and common humanity be made secure."
C. FAiRMAN, supra note 43, at 462. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783 n.7
(1966), Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated, "Congress, not
the judiciary, was viewed as the more likely agency to implement fully the guarantees of
equality, and thus it could be presumed the primary purpose of the Amendment was to
augment the power of Congress, not the judiciary." In the same volume of the reports,
Justice Black emphasized that "the people, in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, desig-
nated the governmental tribunal they wanted to provide additional rules to enforce the
guarantees of that Amendment. The branch of Government they chose was not the Judi-
cial Branch but the Legislative.... But this legislative power which was granted to
Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to Congress." Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678-79 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)) (footnote omitted). Unfortunately, the Brethren
did not notice that on such reasoning the Court had rushed in to desegregation and
reapportionment where Congress feared to tread.
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"the remedy for violation of the 14th and 15th amendments...
was expressly not left to the courts," that it was for Congress to
delegate powers of enforcement to the judiciary.'09 That "great
fact" is what is to be learned from the several enforcement pro-
visions; there is not a glimmer of intention by section five to
endow the courts with "open-ended enforcement powers." 110
Soifer's ignorance of elementary principles of federal juris-
diction leads him to condemn my statement that "a reasoned
argument for a judicial power of enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment-apart from that derived from the grant in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which Congress is free to with-
draw-has yet to be made." "The reason," he tells us, "is proba-
bly that most people still accept Marbury"; "judicial enforce-
ment of the fourteenth amendment," he explains, rests on
Marbury."' Very early the Court held in Cary v. Curtis that
"the judicial power of the United States, although it has its ori-
gin in the Constitution, is .. . dependent for its distribution
. . . entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole
power... of investing them with jurisdiction.., and of with-
holding it from them .... ,"" As later stated in Sheldon v. Sill,
"Courts created by statute [as are the inferior courts] can have
no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.""13 That is con-
firmed by the fact that it was not until 1866 that Congress con-
ferred any federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts." 4
109. R. BERGER, supra note 34, at 351-53.
My quotation of Justice Douglas' remark anent § 5 that "the manner of enforcement
involves discretion; but that discretion is largely entrusted to Congress, not the courts,"
leads Soifer to comment that "this peculiar assertion raises several problems; the four-
teenth amendment says nothing of 'discretion' for either Congress or the judiciary."
Soifer, supra note 2, at 689 (emphasis added). But § 5 does not command Congress to
enforce; it provides, "Congress shall have power to enforce," leaving to its discretion
whether and what to enforce. Cf. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1796). When he argues that nobody else was
aware that "judicial power was withheld," Soifer, supra note 2, at 690 n.193, he overlooks
that federal jurisdiction must be delegated by Congress (see text accompanying note 112
infra) and that it had been withheld by § 5. For the framers' knowledge that it had been
withheld, see Senator Morton's above-quoted statement.
110. The "open-ended" theory has been rested on the terms of § 1 not § 5. See R.
BERGER, supra note 1, at 99-116.
111. Soifer, supra note 2, at 690 n.193.
112. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
113. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850).
114. See C. WRIGHT, FEDmm CouRTs 4 (1963).
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In short, federal jurisdiction is not drawn from Marbury but
must be conferred by Congress. What Congress delegates, ac-
cording to Sheldon v. Sill, it can withdraw. This Soifer labels
"peculiar" reasoning, but it is his obliviousness of the elements
of federal jurisdiction that is "peculiar."
A. Natural Law
It bears repetition that whatever the influence of natural
law, it did not overcome the framers' unmistakable exclusion of
suffrage and segregation from both the Civil Rights Act and the
amendment. Nor did it expand their careful enumeration of
rights in the Act. Nevertheless, Soifer, like a clown who lustily
thwacks away with a bag of soot, charges me with "unwillingness
to concede the influence of natural law theory and antislavery
thought on the Republicans of the 39th Congress." 115 He charges
that "Berger supports his assertion that natural law had little if
any influence on the legislators of the 39th Congress chiefly by
reference to Professor Cover's discussion of judges who faced a
crisis of conscience in fugitive slave cases." ' Now my discussion
of natural law was entirely in the frame of judicial claims to
extra-constitutional power, as can speedily be discerned in my
chapter "From Natural Law to Libertarian Due Process."' 1 7
Soifer considers "Cover's key point is that judges thought them-
selves bound to follow law they despised," that they deemed
themselves "committed to what they took to be a clear constitu-
tional command to return fugitive slaves." 1 s That was exactly
my point: "Prior to the Civil War, the courts were most inhospi-
table to 'natural rights' as Robert Cover convincingly
shows ... ."1u At no point did I deduce from this that legis-
lators were or were not influenced by natural law. If it played
115. Soifer, supra note 2, at 657.
116. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
117. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 249-82.
118. Soifer, supra note 2, at 662.
119. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 390. Contrast this with Soifer's statement that
Berger "misrepresents one of Cover's central points. Cover says that '[t]he notion that
out beyond lay a higher law to which the judges qua judges was responsible was never a
part of the mainstream of American jurisprudence.' Berger's quotation ...omits the
italicized portion, which is of critical importance." Soifer, supra note 2, at 662. Since the
context of the quotation in my book was judicial reaching for extra-constitutional power,
R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 250-54, there was no need to repeat the judicial theme.
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a role in drafting the Civil Rights Act, the fear of a consider-
able number of framers that it was unconstitutional led to the
framing of the fourteenth amendment.2 0 There was no need
for an amendment if legislators considered that natural law was
available. In drafting an amendment they could write their own
ticket, without reliance on natural or other law, for what the
people adopted was "law." So my reading of Cover does not
prove that Berger "chops out quotations.. . misreads or mis-
uses Cover.
1
2
2 1
By way of prelude to his promised treatment of the "his-
tory," Soifer states,
For points basic to his history and his theory, Berger relies
heavily on the subtle and important work of Robert Cover...
and of Morton Horwitz.... The way in which Berger misreads
or misuses those recent secondary works should serve as a
warning for his reading of the older and murkier [?] primary
sources.
1 2 2
Cover, we have seen, was cited merely to show that judges did
not in the pre-1866 years rely on natural law to override positive
law; so Soifer himself reads Cover. In discussing the presupposi-
tions of the Founders in 1787, I cited Horwitz for the proposi-
tion that they feared judicial discretion. And in process I quoted
Horwitz' citation of Chief Justice Hutchinson's statement in
1767, "the Judge should never be the Legislator: Because then
the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a
State of Slavery. 12 8 In dismissing Hutchinson, Soifer mounts to
sublime heights of absurdity:
It will not do to rely, as Berger does.., on quotations from
Thomas Hutchinson of all people . .. to describe mid-nine-
teenth century thought [a gross misrepresentation].... Reli-
ance on the Tory Governor of Massachusetts is particularly pe-
culiar in a book.., which is strident about strict separation of
powers, since Hutchinson simultaneously held high office in the
executive, legislative and judicial branches.
124
120. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 23 n.12.
121. Soifer, supra note 2, at 660.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 306-07.
124. Soifer, supra note 2, at 679 & n.144.
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To insist on the separation of powers when they are wielded by
the same hands-as in modern administrative agencies-makes
Hutchinson's self-denying view of judicial power the more im-
pressive. If he was "not generally revered by Americans, ' 125 in
this particular he reflected their anxieties; and I leave Soifer
to quarrel with Horwitz, who cited Hutchinson, let alone that
Horwitz is corroborated by Gordon Wood's view that the colo-
nists had "a profound fear of judicial independence and
discretion.
1 26
Coupled with my citation of Horwitz for the 1787 presup-
positions of the Founders respecting the narrow scope of the ju-
dicial function, I noted his complementary view that instrumen-
talism, i.e., courts as instruments of change, first emerged in the
19th century,127 and therefore exerted no influence on the Foun-
ders. Soifer maintains that Berger "grossly misuses Professor
Horwitz' point, however, in not noting that it had arrived by
1866."'12" But that was irrelevant to its influence on the Foun-
ders. Moreover, Horwitz dealt with courts as instruments of
change of the common law, i.e., torts and contracts, not as claim-
ants of power to revise the Constitution, the subject of my
book.129 Despite the fact that "'common law rules were [being]
conceived of as made not discovered,' "130 judicial claims of
power to change the Constitution had to wait for our time.31
The grant by section five of the enforcement power to Congress,
not the Court, is at war with an endorsement by framers dis-
trustful of the courts of judicial instrumentalism as a medium of
constitutional change.132 Change, they were showing, could be
125. Id. at 679 n.144.
126. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AmicAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 298 (1969).
127. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 307-08.
128. Soifer, supra note 2, at 679 (emphasis added).
129. These involve quite different considerations. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 320-
23. From judicial instrumentalism Soifer concludes, "if section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
was intended to refer to common law, it was not a reference to something 'fixed.'"
Soifer, supra note 2, at 679. Again he is carried away by his theorizing; the enumeration
of the rights to contract, to own property, etc., did not refer to an overarching "common
law" but to those described rights alone.
130. Soifer, supra note 2, at 679.
131. See statements by Lusky, note 3 supra, and by Chief Justice Marshall, text
accompanying note 202 infra.
132. In 1868, Fairman remarks, "the court did not enjoy and did not deserve confi-
dence in the lofty disinterest of its members." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 514. For
additional citations, see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth,
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accomplished by means of the amendment process provided by
article V.
B. State Sovereignty
Soifer's incomprehension of facts leads him repeatedly to
misrepresent my views as to State sovereignty. He attributes to
me the foolish view that "the Civil War had no impact on the
states' rights and state sovereignty theories he wishes to impose
as the postwar congressional intent."138 Who could overlook the
thirteenth amendment which outlawed slavery within the
States? He charges me with an "absolutist state sovereignty con-
cept," and damningly states, Berger "can still assert-in the face
of the statute he regards as key to understanding the fourteenth
amendment-that 'no trace of an intention by the Fourteenth
Amendment to encroach on State control [Soifer omits "for ex-
ample, of suffrage and segregation"] . . .is to be found in the
records of the 39th Congress.' ""U Of course I was not so idiotic
as to assert "in the face" of the Civil Rights Act that there was
no encroachment on state control. In the Southern states, as
Senator Daniel Clark of New Hampshire stated, slaves, "had no
rights which a white man was bound to respect"; 35 they were
simply chattels, nonpersons. If the framers were to shield blacks
from violence and oppression, as Windom noted, to protect their
"right to exist," some "encroachment" on states' rights was ines-
capable. But that "encroachment" was limited; it did not em-
brace, "for example, suffrage and segregation,"138 the very words
74 Nw. U.L. REV. 311, 350-51 (1979).
133. Soifer, supra note 2, at 687 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 683, 676 (emphasis added).
135. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 201.
136. So it was understood by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883). Justice Bradley declared that the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 undertook to secure
"those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties... and to inherit, purchase ... prop-
erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... [C]ongress did not assume... to adjust what
may be called the social rights of men... but only to declare and vindicate those funda-
mental rights.. . "Id. at 22. And in response to the question whether "admission to an
inn, a public conveyance, a place of public amusement" is "one of the rights which the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment are forbidden to deny to any person," the Court
held that "no countenance of authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which purported
to convey such ['rights'] . . .can be found in ... the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution .... ." Id. at 24, 25.
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"omitted" by the Soifer ellipsis, the self-same Soifer who cries
alarm at my every innocuous omission for purposes of
compression.
Having established by the statements of the framers their
intention to exclude suffrage and segregation from the amend-
ment, I found by their own testimony two factors that led them
thus to limit the "encroachment": Negrophobia and attachment
to state sovereignty. "The proposition to prohibit states from
denying civil or political rights to any class of persons," said
Roscoe Conkling, "encounters a great objection on the thresh-
hold. It trenches upon the principle of existing local sovereignty
.... It takes away a right which has always been supposed to
inhere in the States.113 7 Samuel Marshall of Illinois stated, "It is
a fundamental principle of American law that the regulation of
the local police of all the domestic affairs of a State belongs to
the State itself, and not to the Federal Government."'3 This
sentiment emerged even more sharply when suffrage was in is-
sue. Chairman Fessenden observed in the Senate, "every body
has admitted.., that the power to fix the qualifications of vot-
ers rested with the States."13 9 Several pages of my book are
crowded with such quotations, summarized by Harry Flack:
"The Radical leaders were aware as anyone of the attachment of
a great majority of the people to the doctrine of States' rights
... the right of the States to regulate their own internal
affairs.
,140
To such statements I added the confirmatory remarks of
three commentators who enjoy Soifer's esteem: Harold Hyman,
M.L. Benedict, and Philip Paludan. Soifer asserts that "Berger
misrepresents their sophisticated argument .... Let them
speak for themselves. Hyman wrote, "One reason the Recon-
struction of the South loomed so high to northerners was less
that blacks were involved than that every one understood the
preeminence of states . . ."; "[a] heavy phalanx of Republican
137. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 61.
138. Id. at 61 n.39. Concurring in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 138
(1873), Justice Field averred, "No one has ever pretended, that I am aware of, that the
fourteenth amendment interferes in any respect with the police power of the State ....
It was not adopted for any such purpose."
139. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 62.
140. Id. at 60-64, 63.
141. Soifer, supra note 2, at 688.
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politicos, including Sherman and Trumbull ... were States
right nationalists, suspicious of any new functional path the na-
tion travelled." 142 Benedict wrote, "the proposed amendment
again demonstrated Republican reluctance to expand the na-
tional government's jurisdiction over its citizens," and that it "in
no way challenged the tradition that the states had primary ju-
risdiction over citizens in matters of police regulation .... ,143
Paludan repeatedly emphasized that the pervasive attachment
to federalism-state control of local institutions-was "the most
potent institutional obstacle to the Negroes' hope for protected
liberty. '144 Whatever the thrust of their ultimate conclusions,
Hyman-Benedict-Paludan can hardly maintain that their une-
quivocal utterances do not mean what they plainly say. A lead-
ing Reconstruction activist, Alfred Kelly, declared that the
"commitment to traditional state-federal relations meant that
the radical Negro reform program could be only a very limited
one."14
5
Soifer's heroic labors enabled him to unearth a citation that
I had lost in the recesses of the debates and correctly attribute
the quotation to James Wilson rather than Senator Henry Wil-
son.146 But again his incomprehension of what he reads recalls
the New Yorker cartoon that pictured a father disconsolately
looking at his little son's report card, captioned "But why did
you get an A for effort?" He cites my reference to Wilson as an
example of "misleading" and "internally inconsistent" history,
another example of "how badly Berger misuses historical materi-
als.11 47 In his version of my words, Wilson
fully appreciated the difference between congressional author-
ity over the District [of Columbia where desegregation was pro-
posed] and over the states. Because Wilson "lamented that in
142. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 63 n.50.
143. Id. at 242 n.53, 190 n.91.
144. Id. at 155.
145. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
It was not the purpose of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities
clause "to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have men-
tioned... from the States to the Federal Government ..... Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872). "[O]ur statesmen have still believed that the existence of
the States with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of
civil rights-the rights of person and of property-was essential ...... Id. at 82.
146. Soifer, supra note 2, at 654 n.17.
147. Id. at 654-55.
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'dealing with the States,' State 'constitutions block up the way
and we may not overleap the barriers,'" Berger is certain that
he recognized the inviolability of state sovereignty, "which the
framers were zealous to preserve.' 48
He has me describing Wilson "as zealous to preserve state sover-
eignty,"14 9 an arrant misrepresentation. Before the Wilson quo-
tation, I had stated "it is unrealistic to presume that a Congress
which has plenary jurisdiction over the District and yet refused
to bar segregation there would turn around to invade State sov-
ereignty, which the framers were zealous to preserve, in order to
impose a requirement of desegregation upon the States. The dif-
ference was fully appreciated by Wilson." 150 To recognize a dif-
ference manifestly is different from being "zealous to preserve"
it, let alone that Wilson "lamented" the difference. And it is I
who am charged with "carelessness," and "misuse [of] historical
materials"!
Soifer's explanation falls in the category "the more he ex-
plains the less I understand it." Wilson's point, he says, "was
quite different. Certainly his remarks were not a paean to state
sovereignty [who said they were?]. His theme was that state con-
stitutions and state laws had in the past blocked the broad,
bright surface of the Constitution."151 Soifer's change of diction
does not alter Wilson's recognition that "we may not overleap
the barriers of State constitutions." When Soifer goes on to state
that "Wilson's speech here, and his words in opposition to the
famous Bingham 'deletion'. .. were paradigmatic statements of
the optimistic political theory of the congressional leader-
ship,"'1 52 he is deluded by his own rhetoric. Wilson had in fact
recommended the deletion to avoid a "latitudinarian construc-
tion" and preclude a "construction beyond the specific rights
named...";15 3 he had assured the House that the Civil Rights
Bill did not extend to desegregated schools or to service on ju-
ries, that it did not include "the right of suffrage."'5 Such are
148. Id. at 655 n.20.
149. Id.
150. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 124.
151. Soifer, supra note 2, at 655 n.20 (emphasis added). But compare text accompa-
nying notes 74-78 supra, and see notes 75 & 78 supra.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 36 & 77 supra.
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the statements representing the "optimistic political theory of
the congressional leadership," which allegedly "cannot be recon-
ciled with Mr. Berger's entire historical interpretation .... 155
In this connection, Soifer remarks that "with disarming
simplicity, Berger asserts that '[t]he converse of the fact that the
"radicals did not dominate" is that the Conservative-Moderate
coalition did.' ,156 He neglects to mention Benedict's statement
that the radicals "did not dominate Congress during the Recon-
struction era," but that the "Conservatives, Moderates (Cen-
trists)" did. And Benedict concluded that "the non-radicals had
enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence of some
radicals and over the opposition of many. ' 157 David Donald had
earlier arrived at similar conclusions. 158 Soifer considers that the
work of Benedict and Donald represents the "best two recent
efforts to place the men of the 39th Congress along the political
spectrum ... .""' Thus what Soifer regards as notable scholar-
ship becomes "simplicity" when repeated by me! Who is wearing
"blinders"? 60
Soifer's discussion of the tenth amendment again misunder-
stands and misrepresents the facts: "One does not find many
references to the tenth amendment in the debates of the 39th
Congress. Berger does not find a single reference to quote. His
frequent reliance on the tenth amendment, therefore, appears
based on his own interpretation, akin to that of Justice Rehn-
quist,"161 in activist eyes guilt by association. Exactitude re-
quires notice that my index contains no reference to the tenth
amendment; I located a footnote statement that "[t]he proposi-
tion that 'the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of
Rights' constitutes an invasion of rights reserved to the States
by the Tenth Amendment, an invasion of such magnitude as to
155. Soifer, supra note 2, at 656 n.20. Soifer invokes Wilson to demonstrate "Ber-
ger's apparent incapacity to understand the thrust of Wilson's remarks because they do
not fit his theory." Id. at 654 n.17.
156. Id. at 670.
157. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 237, 239.
158. Id. at 237.
159. Soifer, supra note 2, at 681 n.96. The rejection of the radical suffrage proposals
by 125 to 12 and 34 to 4 speak for themselves. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43
supra.
160. "Berger's preconceptions and his carelessness provide him with a convenient
set of blinders." Soifer, supra note 2, at 681.
161. Id. at 688 n.185 (emphasis added).
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demand proof that such was the framers' intention."' 2 Whether
or not the tenth amendment figured in the debates is beside the
point; it remained in the Constitution and is to be read with the
other provisions. That is elementary learning. A framer who con-
strued the amendment broadly, Senator Frederick Frelinghuy-
sen, said in 1871 that "the Fourteenth Amendment must...
not be used to make the General Government imperial. It must
be read. . . together with the tenth amendment." 163 Here Soifer
comes up with his strawman: "The absolute state sovereignty
concept employed by Berger [?] is obviously [not] contained in
the tenth amendment, which reserves to the people powers
which Berger vilifies [over-heated advocacy] as open-ended."164
My discussion of "open-ended" denied that the terms of the
fourteenth-not the tenth-amendment constituted an "invita-
tion" to the courts to revise and amend the Constitution.16 5
Throughout I insisted that by article V that power was reserved
to the people alone. The Court is not the people. So I did not
"vilify" the tenth amendment's reservation of power to the peo-
ple but insisted rather that it be respected.
C. Declaration of Independence, Sumner and Abolitionism
Soifer beats a tattoo on the influence of the Declaration of
Independence and natural law on the framers. Just as he cited
one Congressman, Lawrence, to prove that the framers adopted
the notion that absolute rights could not be withdrawn in the
teeth of copious evidence to the contrary, so he dwells on
Charles Sumner's "devotion" to the "principles" of the Declara-
tion.' So too, on the basis of Henry Wilson's (Sumner's Massa-
chusetts' colleague) statement that the "men who promulgated
the Declaration of Independence" were "those same radicals"
who "made the Constitution," Soifer taxes me with "a simplistic
Beardian notion that 'the Declaration was a product of rebels
and revolutionaries' and the Constitution 'in no small part' was
162. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 137 n.17.
163. Berger, supra note 34, at 325.
164. Soifer, supra note 2, at 683 (emphasis added).
165. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 99-116.
166. Soifer, supra note 2, at 661 n.51. He gains little by stressing that "Trumbull
and James Wilson... constantly invoked God and the fundamental rights in the Decla-
ration," id., for that did not alter their view that the rights were limited and that suf-
frage and segregation were excluded. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
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a recoil from the 'excesses' of popularly controlled legisla-
tures. 1 7 The "unquestioned leader of the House,"1" Thaddeus
Stevens, said however that "while the Declaration clearly proved
what the intention then was, the action of the Convention in
framing the Constitution... bartered away ... some of those
inalienable rights .... "-169 By the time of the Convention, said
Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, "The demo-
cratic movement was in abeyance, a 'thermidorean reaction' was
in full swing. Hence the Federal Constitution put a stopper to
those levelling and confiscatory demands of democracy. '17 0 A
"simplistic Beardian notion"!
The views of Henry Wilson and Sumner gain little from the
fact that abolitionist philosophy "was taken from the Declara-
tion of Independence," that it was "an official Republican party
policy at the 1860 Republican Convention."17 1 For what counts
is the views of the framers who did the drafting and voting in
Congress in 1866.172 Stevens, as we have seen, denied that the
Declaration and Constitution were identical. Incontrovertible
proof that this dichotomy persisted is the exclusion of suffrage
from the amendment, suffrage, the central right which would en-
able the black to protect himself.17 3 Senator Jacob Howard, a
favorite of the neoabolitionists, stated that he could not discover
the Negro right to vote in the Declaration of Independence and
167. Soifer, supra note 2, at 656 n.20, 661 n.51.
168. Id. at 693.
169. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1967 (1868) (emphasis added). Stevens had
earlier stated in the 39th Congress,
Sir, our fathers made the Declaration of Independence... but.., when our
fathers came to reduce the principles on which they founded this Government
into order... an institution hot from hell [slavery] appeared among them...
and precluded them from carrying out their own principles into the organic law
of this Union.
R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 88.
170. 1 S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIc 300
(4th ed. 1950).
171. Soifer, supra note 2, at 665 n.68, 666. Undeniably Sumner and other radicals
meant to "extirpate slavery," id. at 666 n.70, and the thirteenth amendment owed a
great deal to their efforts. But the issue is whether their influence carried to the abolition
of all discriminations, and here the incontrovertible evidence is that they failed. See text
accompanying notes 29-37, 41-43, 56-63, & 71-77 supra.
172. See the views expressed in text accompanying notes 42-43, 95-100.
173. Sumner insisted that "if the Fourteenth is inadequate to protect persons in
their ... right to vote, it is inadequate to protect them in anything." CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869).
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that "notwithstanding the Declaration of Independence, it is the
right of every organized community to regulate the right of suf-
frage.' 174 Contrast the Stevens-Howard statements with Soifer's
charge that "the 'historical facts' Berger invokes to dismiss any
influence of the Declaration of Independence are simply his as-
sertion ... .,, He "simply" is incapable of weighing evidence,
of appreciating that in the construction of legislation the deci-
sive facts are the explanations of the framers, not what some
may think outside the legislative halls.
D. Sumner and the Abolitionists
Soifer's inability to weigh evidence is again illustrated by
his treatment of Sumner. My quotation of David Donald's state-
ment that "more and more Senators came to distrust [Sumner]
when they did not detest him," is dismissed because "It is
sloppy to take a single quotation . . . out of context to prove
Sumner's lack of influence"; "Sumner was not an ineffective out-
cast, as Berger contends.' 7 6 To counter Donald's bald state-
ment, Soifer recounts that Sumner "had an enormous impact on
public opinion"; he was "a heroic figure" and "the spokesman of
a movement which transcended politics," "who sought to secure
to all its citizens equal rights,' 1 77 facts which I would not deny.
But this does not meet Sumner's repeated rebuffs in the Senate,
and it is those votes that count in construing the amendment.
For example, his proposal that in the rebel States "there shall be
no denial of rights, civil or political on account of race" was re-
174. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 88. Nevertheless Soifer "wonders how Berger ig-
nored" the "many references to the Declaration of Independence" in the 39th Congress,
Soifer, supra note 2, at 681, and maintains that "Berger overlooks the remarkably fre-
quent references to the Declaration of Independence in the debates in the 39th Con-
gress." Id. at 661 n.51 (emphasis added).
175. Soifer, supra note 2, at 661 n.51. Soifer's slippery exegesis is illustrated by his
statement that "for Berger, Justice Samuel Chase's reliance on natural law in 1798 in
Calder v. Bull 'departed from the Founders' commitment to written limits on all power.'
Therefore, any reference to the natural rights of the Declaration of Independence to aid
in understanding of the Constitution is, to Berger '[m]anifestly... out of tune with the
historical facts."' Id. at 661 (emphasis added). The latter sentence is contained at my
page 88 wherein I set out the above-quoted Stevens statement and others in the 39th
Congress. The Chase statement at my page 252 had no reference whatever to the Decla-
ration of Independence. But Soifer heedlessly mixes all ingredients into his Mulligan
stew.
176. Id. at 693.
177. Id. at 693-94 n.205.
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jected 39 to 8; his proposal that the Tennessee Constitution
should provide for black suffrage was defeated 34 to 4.178 Ste-
vens excoriated Sumner for "slaughter[ing]" the prototype
amendment because it did not give Negroes the vote, reciting
some of Sumner's corrosive criticism and scornfully branding it
as "puerile and pedantic. '17 9 As the Reconstruction debate pro-
ceeded, Senator Trumbull scathingly considered him "by far the
greatest fool of the lot."180 Fessenden declared in 1870 that "it
has been over the idiosyncracies, over the unreasonable proposi-
tions, over the impractical measures of [Sumner] that freedom
has been proclaimed and established."1 81
Undaunted, Sumner continued to press for broadened
human rights, citing the "great rule of interpretation conquered
at Appomattox," and insisting that "the Constitution must be
interpreted by the Declaration." 2 He was met with remarks
such as that of Senator Morrill of Maine, "If the Senator from
Massachusetts cannot put his fingers on the provision of the
Constitution which warrants this measure, those impassioned
appeals to these higher considerations should have no
weight."183 Of Sumner's attempt to achieve "complete equality
before the law," Morrill observed, "There is no doubt how he
feels on that subject, but the misfortune after all, is that the
Senate has never agreed with him upon the subject."M What
boots it that "[a]lmost all congressmen were awed by ... Sena-
tor Sumner's undimmed passion for good causes and unequalled
knowledge of classical history,"18 5 if it could not be translated
into Senate votes, and it is those votes that reveal the framers'
intent.
Soifer's reliance on abolitionist theory is of the same kidney:
178. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 164, 59-60 (emphasis added). See also Sumner's
defeated proposal, note 43 supra.
179. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 236; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2549
(1866). Stevens confessed his "mortification at its defeat. . . especially because it almost
closed the door of hope for the amelioration of the condition of the freedmen." Id.
180. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 236.
181. Id. See statement by Stevens, note 179 supra.
182. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 727, 728 (1872).
183. Id. at app. 1-2. Senator Matthew Carpenter of Wisconsin scornfully remarked
that Sumner "is not trammeled by the Constitution. He ascends into the higher, serener,
more general atmosphere of the Declaration of Independence." Id. at 827.
184. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
185. Soifer, supra note 2, at 693 n.205.
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"the theory of the antislavery movement is basic to comprehen-
sion of the rights that antislavery veterans, who controlled Con-
gress, hoped to secure in 1866. ' 18'e Of course the abolition of
slavery by the thirteenth amendment, and the protection of the
freedmen from violence and oppression by the fourteenth, re-
flected abolitionist influence. But beyond this abolitionist aspi-
rations were balked; they could not obtain suffrage, desegrega-
tion, and abolition of all discriminations. 187 That is revealed by
Sumner's losing struggle. Bingham, whom Soifer's authorities,
Jacobus ten Broek and Howard Jay Graham, regard as the con-
duit through which abolitionist concepts of substantive due pro-
cess and equal protection were poured into the fourteenth
amendment,188 moved for deletion of the "no discrimination in
civil rights" clause; he fought against compulsory incorporation
in the Tennessee Constitution of black suffrage and won by a
vote of 125 to 12, s18 an irreducible fact that speaks more loudly
than abolitionist ebullitions outside of Congress. Benedict, so
warmly praised by Soifer, justly concluded that the Conserva-
186. Id. at 658.
187. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
The "masterful" David Donald, id. at 693 n.205, concluded that "the Radical wing of
the Republican party had rarely exercised effective control." R. BERGER, supra note 1, at
236 n.30. See statement by Benedict, text accompanying note 157 supra.
Professor C. Vann Woodward noted that during the war years "the great majority of
citizens in the North still abhorred any association with abolitionists." C. WOODWARD,
THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 79 (1960). Beyond doubt the North emerged from
the fiery furnace determined to end slavery, and did so by the thirteenth amendment.
But as Woodward remarked, the eradication of inequality required a "revolution in the
North." Charles Fairman observed, "Whereas the Thirteenth Amendment had been gen-
erally popular among Northerners, the Civil Rights Bill [of 1866], as James G. Blaine
recalled, was legislation 'of a different type,' which particularly in the Middle and West-
ern States, touched upon deep feelings." C. FARmAN, supra note 43, at 1168. David Don-
ald commented that the suggestion that "Negroes should be treated as equals to white
men woke solne of the deepest and ugliest fears in the American mind." D. DONALD,
CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 252 (1970).
Soifer, who so heartily commends "context," who condemns my omission to "con-
sider changes in the thought or voting patterns of the North during the 1850's," text
accompanying note 39, supra, is oblivious of the more immediate and radical shift in the
voting pattern in 1865-1868, when Negro suffrage was repeatedly rejected to Northern
unreadiness to undertake a "revolution" in the interests of across the board "equality."
"Even abolitionists," Brock states, "were anxious to disclaim any intention of forcing
social contacts between the races." W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION 286 (1963). See Thaddeus Stevens' apprehensive comment on the arm-in-
arm walk of Theodore Tilton and Frederick Douglass, R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 15.
188. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 119-20.
189. See text accompanying notes 42 & 71 supra.
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss3/2
1981] SOIFER TO THE RESCUE
tive-Moderate coalition, not the "radicals" (abolitionist extrem-
ists) controlled the 39th Congress.190 While the amendment was
up for ratification, Senator John Sherman boasted in Cincinnati,
"we defeated every radical proposition in it."'19' Such are the
facts Soifer describes as "Berger asserts away the influence of
abolitionist thought on the 39th Congress"! 92
In Soifer's catalog of matters "Berger fails to mention," are
some "early judicial interpretations."193 They were wiped out by
the Slaughter-House Cases which, as Soifer himself notes, "evis-
cerated the privileges and immunities clause,"'" and which were
capped by the Civil Rights Cases declaration "that it was time
the black man 'cease[d] to be the special favorite of the law."'1"
There civil rights slumbered for about half a century. Neverthe-
less it is worthwhile to examine his exegesis of at least one of his
citations, for it underlines his abiding preference for rhetoric
over fact. United States v. Rhodes (1866) "held that a black wo-
man had a right to testify against a gang of white men who had
forcibly entered her home."'" Since the Civil Rights Act specifi-
cally granted the right "to sue, be parties and give evidence,"
the right to testify could not be denied. Soifer stresses the
190. See note 187 supra.
191. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 105.
192. Soifer, supra note 2, at 659 (emphasis added). In another of his misrepresenta-
tions, Soifer alleges that "In a sentence which is both imprecise and incorrect, Berger
states that Phillips and Garrison 'overshadowed' the Western abolitionist theorists.
Therefore, Berger believes, he can dismiss the arguments of legal historians with whom
he disagrees, like Jacobus ten Broek and Howard Jay Graham ..... Id. at 665 (emphasis
added). My "imprecise and incorrect" statement was drawn from one of Soifer's demi-
gods, Robert Cover. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 230. And my dismissal of ten Broek and
Graham was based upon a painstaking analysis of their views, which can be located
through the index of my book.
Instead of "asserting away" abolitionist theory, I devoted a fact-crammed chapter to
it. See id. at 230-45. Among the facts are that Senators Fessenden and Grimes, Republi-
can leaders, held "the extreme radicals" in "abhorrence," id. at 235, that Senator Edgar
Cowan, a Pennsylvania Conservative, bitingly condemned the Anti-Slavery Society. Id.
at 235. And the repeated rejection of proposals to bar discrimination with respect to all
rights by overwhelming votes shows how little influence the abolitionists exercised with
respect to the issues that are my central concern-suffrage and segregation.
193. Soifer, supra note 2, at 696-97.
194. Id. at 699. Notwithstanding, Soifer upbraids me for not noting Justice Miller's
"important comments": "the people. . .[gave] additional power to the Federal Govern-
ment," id., forgetting that Miller "eviscerated the privileges and immunities" clause
which was the vehicle of those substantive rights. Id.
195. Id. at 698.
196. Id. at 697.
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Court's statements that the "thirteenth amendment 'trenches
directly upon the power of the state,'" that it "was an 'act of
national grace' which would continue to perform its function...
." "This language," he .comments, "plainly indicates neither at-
tachment to state sovereignty, nor a sense of limitation on fed-
eral power imposed by the tenth amendment. '197 How could a
court oppose its "attachment to state sovereignty" to the breach
made by the thirteenth amendment? Nor could the tenth
amendment derogate from the later unequivocal ban of slavery
by the thirteenth, adopted in due form by the people. Justice
Bradley, whose dissent in Slaughter House excites Soifer's ad-
miration,9 8 rejected the assumption, in the subsequent Civil
Rights Cases, that a power to enforce a prohibition with respect
to a particular subject "gives Congress power to legislate gener-
ally upon the subject" as "repugnant to the Tenth Amend-
ment."199 To activist zealots like Soifer the tenth amendment
represents a barrier that must at all costs be razed.
Instead of belaboring Soifer's analysis of his other cases, let
me close with his comment on my quotation from McCulloch v.
Mtryland: "We admit, as all must admit, that the powers.of the
government are limited, and that its limits are not to be tran-
scended,"200 an unchallengeable truism. This he translates as my
attempt "to illustrate basic democratic limitations on judicial
power"; and such is his indignation that English invective no
longer suffices, so he brands my view with the Yiddish "sheer
chutzpah," i.e., consummate gall.201 Yet when the decision came
under attack, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that the exercise
of judicial power "cannot be the assertion of a right to change
that instrument, '20 2 the Constitution. That is the essence of my
thesis.
There are many more examples of curdled learning, of in-
comprehension and misrepresentation, but it is time to take pity
on the patient reader. Already I have gone far beyond Justice
Jackson: "if the first decision cited does not support [the pro-
197. Id.
198. Id. at 698-99.
199. R. BERGE , supra note 1, at 76 n.18.
200. Id. at 2 n.4.
201. Soifer, supra note 2, at 669 n.88.
202. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 377 (emphasis added).
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position] I conclude that the lawyer has a blunderbuss mind and
rely on him no further."20
Im. CONCLUSION
There is no need to recapitulate Soifer's shortcomings. Suf-
fice it that one who exalts Sumner's "enormous impact on north-
ern public opinion" 204 while ignoring that in the Senate he was
time and again resoundingly rejected manifestly has not learned
to weigh evidence. As with other activists, facts are not really
congenial to him. Robert Bork remarked that one cannot "swing
a cat by the tail in the faculty lounge without damaging some
stern young philosopher. 20 5 They have yet to learn, however,
that a philosophy not rooted in the soil of fact is delusory. "Only
where evidence exists," Professor Oscar Handlin observes, "can
theory complement it. ''2°6 Consider Soifer's guru, Robert Cover,
whose recommended
reading of the Constitution must stand or fall not upon the
Constitution's self-evident meaning, nor upon the intention of
the 1787 or 1866 framers.... [It is for us, not the framers, to
decide whether that end of liberty is best served by entrusting
to judges a major role in defining our governing political ideas
and in measuring the activity of the primary actors [Congress
and the legislatures] in majoritarian politics against that
ideology.20
7
Thus no warrant is required for setting aside the Constitutional
text in favor of an ideology framed by judges for the measure-
ment of "majoritarian politics." Nowhere does Cover point to a
referendum of the people entrusting that awesome role to
judges; instead he blandly identifies the preferences of his small
academic coterie--"us"-with constitutional warrant, substitut-
ing "a theoretically grounded formula for evidence. '20 8
203. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court, 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 804 (1961).
204. Soifer, supra note 2, at 693 n.205.
205. Address before the American Enterprise Institute conference on "The Role of
the Judiciary in America," in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13, 1978) mimeographed copy, p. 4.
206. 0. FLiwuN, supra note 9, at 274. Handlin reminds us that long before Ranke,
"historians had insisted that there could be no good interpretation that did not rest on
valid fact." Id. at 157.
207. Cover, Book Review, New Republic 26, 27 (Jan. 14, 1978) (emphasis added).
208. 0. HANDLn, supra note 9, at 273.
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In justice to Soifer, he has not been content to indulge in
theorizing only but assayed the task of sorting out the facts. Un-
fortunately he is ill-equipped to understand them, and in seek-
ing to demonstrate my "misuse of the historical materials" he
has only betrayed his own incompetence.209 Soifer is an impas-
sioned crusader whose overwrought zeal clouds his vision and
who makes his predilections the test of constitutionality. Long
since I refused to identify my predilections with constitutional
mandates; 210 and I came to my study of the fourteenth amend-
ment in the service of no cause other than the integrity of con-
stitutional construction. For that purpose I sought to ascertain
what the framers intended the fourteenth amendment to mean,
being without preconceptions as to what it ought to mean. It
came as no surprise to me that Soifer and his fellow True Be-
lievers should be dismayed by my findings;211 rather I remain
hopeful, in the words of Samuel Johnson, that "the most obsti-
nate incredulity may be shamed or silenced by the facts. ' 21 2 The
facts will speak for themselves long after the present actors are
gone from the scene.
209. Senator Edgar Cowan, a conservative Republican from Pennsylvania, ridiculed
the notion that the "antipathy that never sleeps, that never dies" is "to be swept away
by half a dozen reports from certain abolitionist societies." R. BERGER, supra note 1, at
235.
210. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHL L. REv. 602 (1942).
211. Commenting on the neo-abolitionist efforts of ten Broek & Co. to rationalize
the Warren Court's segregation and reapportionment decisions, Professor Max Beloff, an
eminent British political scientist, wrote, "The quite extraordinary contortions that have
gone into proving the contrary [of the fourteenth's limited nature] make sad reading for
those impressed by the high quality of American legal-historical scholarship." Beloff, Ar-
biters of America's Destiny, The Times, Higher Ed. Supp. H (London, Apr. 7, 1978).
212. J. BoSwELL, THE LiwE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 1077 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1952).
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Appendix A*
I.
Commentators who advocate the judicial adoption of a
"modern Constitution" tend to look with disdain upon the in-
tentions of those who labored so hard to frame the written docu-
ment. That standards of interpretation should be based upon
these intentions is labeled as a "filiopietistic notion" completely
out of place in what these advocates are convinced is a more
enlightened age.$ Judges are more circumspect. Rare indeed is
the judge who will concede that his decision departs in the
slightest from the meaning and intent of the carefully prepared
text. The American public must be "mercifully soothed" into a
belief that each judicial pronouncement, no matter how auto-
cratic, is made in compliance with the people's constitutional
mandate.4 However, a court which pays only lip-service to a
"continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history,
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society,
and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing
and preserving American freedoms," 5 is derelict in fulfilling the
obligations carefully imposed upon it by the framers of our Con-
stitution. Consistent with this belief, we deem it important to
reexamine, even though briefly, the role that the federal judici-
ary was designed to play in our democratic society.6
* Excerpt from Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1978), Circuit Judge
Van Graafeiland (with whom Mulligan, Timbers and Meskill, Circuit Judges, concur),
dissenting. Footnotes are numbered as in the original.
3. A. Miller & R. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. CH. L. REv. 661, 683 (1960).
4. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 92 (1962). Professor Forrester
writes that the time has come for candor, that if judges are not basing their decision on
law in any usual sense but "are, in fact, legislating under the guise of judging," they
should be frank and say so. W. Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63
A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1691, 14 L. Ed.2d 510
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
6. "Clio [the muse of history] deserves no throne; but may she not claim a corner
seat at the conference table?" L. Henken, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional
Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 637, 657 (1961).
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A.
Students of constitutional history are agreed that one of the
primary factors which motivated the authors of our Constitution
was the fear of unchecked power in the institutions which they
created.7 It is clear, moreover, that this apprehension was not
directed against the legislative branch alone.8 Unlimited judicial
power was to be guarded against, and this meant, among other
things, that the judiciary was to be precluded from participating
in the legislative process.9 "Judicis est jus dicere non dare"10 was
an established maxim of the English law which served as a guide
and inspiration for the constitutional framers. Rufus King, one
of the Constitutional delegates, stated "that the Judges ought to
be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free
from the bias of having participated in its formation."1
One may wonder how we have moved from the clearly docu-
mented position of the framers of the Constitution to the posi-
tion taken by the majority herein, as illustrated in the above
quoted passages from Chief Judge Kaufman's opinion. The an-
swer is that, as a practical matter, the only restraint upon the
7. "That all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to
preserve their freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutional-
ism." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1-2 (1978).
8. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647, 69
S. Ct. 1173, 93 L. Ed. 1556 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), see also R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 303 (1977).
9. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, Hart and Wechsler's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-8 (2d ed. 1973); BERGER, supra note 8, 300-
11; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 n.6 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
10. "It is the duty of a judge to administer, not to make laws" Lofft, No. 42 (1790).
The following quotations also illustrate the centuries-old English tradition of judicial
restraint:
Though in many other countries everything is left in the breast of the Judge to
determine, yet with us he is only to declare and pronounce, not to make or
new-model, the law.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335.
We cannot make a law, we must go according to the law. That must be our role
and direction.
Parkyns' Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 72 (1696) (per Holt, C.J.).
11. 1 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 97-98, 109 (1911) (quoted
in HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 8). Alexander Hamilton thought, somewhat
naively, it turns out, that judicial encroachment upon legislative authority could be pre-
vented through the impeachment process. See Federalist No. 81 at 526-27 (quoted in
BERGER, supra note 8, at 294).
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power of the federal judiciary is that which is self-imposed. 2
One need only skim through the all too numerous Supreme
Court dissents to recognize that on occasion judicial activism has
been checked with a very loose rein.13 Sometimes this has
pleased the so-called conservatives; at other times, it has grati-
fied the so-called liberals. During the early decades of the twen-
tieth century, those who are today's staunchest supporters of ju-
dicial activism were the most vocal critics of the Supreme
Court's "usurpation" of congressional powers in striking down
social and welfare legislation. 14 When the focus of the judiciary
swung from property rights to personal rights, a new and differ-
ent set of critics came to the fore.15 The issue, as these critics see
it, is not one of liberalism versus conservatism, but one of repre-
sentative democratic government versus judicial autocracy."'
12. Trep v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 677-78, 86 S.Ct.
1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
14. See BERGER, supra note 8, 312-37; TamE, supra 7, 446-49; A. Miller & R.
Howell, supra, 27 U. CHI. L. Rav. at 674; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
522-27, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
15. See BERGER, supra note 8; BICKL, supra note 4; L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958); Henkin, supra, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 367.
16. "The critics start from the assumption that, in a political society which aspires
to representative democracy or at least to popular representation, exercises of power
which cannot find their justification in the ultimate consent of the governed are difficult,
if not impossible, to justify." Tams, supra note 7, at 48.
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